Status: OPEN, 5 sh @ USD 156.88 (2026-08-27, EUR 676.82). Bought without a thesis; this document
is the thesis written after the fact on 2026-09-02 at USD 157.25. Data: stock-data-analyst pass
2026-09-02 (SEC 8-K/10-Q, yfinance, Finnhub), fact-check pass same day. Plan: RDDT_plan.json.
Execution log: RDDT_execution.md.
Reddit is an advertising platform with a small data-licensing line. A platform is three multiplications, and each one has a number to watch:
| Layer | Question | Numbers | Where it can break |
|---|---|---|---|
| Users | Are more people showing up, and are they Reddit's or Google's? | DAUq global / US / international; logged-in vs logged-out (reported for the last time in Q2 2026; from Q3 only total and by geography) | ~60% of daily users are logged-out and arrive mostly from Google search. A Google ranking or AI-Overview change hits users Reddit does not own. Reddit discloses no percentage; the 40–70% figures in circulation are third-party estimates. |
| Monetisation | Is each user worth more? | ARPU (global, US); ad revenue growth; "other" revenue (data licensing) | Ad growth is the whole story; licensing is ~5% of revenue and hinges on two contracts (Google, OpenAI). |
| Real profit | What is left after paying staff in shares? | GAAP operating income (SBC already expensed); FCF minus SBC; basic share count | Adjusted EBITDA and reported FCF add SBC back; only GAAP and FCF-minus-SBC count for the owner. |
Then the repo's two questions: is it good (rule-003 checklist) and is it cheap (rule-004: Graham sensitivity table, implied growth, SBC-adjusted P/FCF, scenario value, Kelly go/no-go).
Stock-based compensation: paying employees with shares or options instead of cash. It costs the owner in two ways. New shares are created, so each existing share owns less of the company. And because no cash leaves the building, "free cash flow" and "adjusted EBITDA" look bigger than what the owner actually keeps. GAAP net income does subtract it, which is why the repo prefers GAAP earnings and FCF-minus-SBC over adjusted figures.
| Reddit, trailing twelve months to Q2 2026 | USD |
|---|---|
| Revenue | 2,779M |
| Reported free cash flow | 1,019M |
| Stock-based compensation | 338M (12.2% of revenue) |
| Free cash flow after SBC | 681M |
| GAAP net income (SBC already expensed) | 871M |
| Price / reported FCF | 29.7x |
| Price / (FCF − SBC) | 44.4x |
The trend is the good news: SBC was 21.5% of revenue in Q3 2024 and is ~12% now; basic share count grew 2.8% in the last year and a USD 1B buyback (USD 240M executed) now offsets new issuance. The rule-003 example ("P/FCF doubled from 42x to 84x") was early-2026 data at a lower revenue base; the doubling still happens, from 30x to 44x. Check SBC as a share of revenue every quarter.
| # | Test | Evidence (2026-09-02) | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Cash after SBC | FCF − SBC USD 681M TTM; GAAP net income USD 871M; gross margin 91% | PASS |
| 2 | Balance sheet survives a bad year | USD 2.77B net cash, no bonds or converts | PASS |
| 3 | Not funding itself with shares | No ATM, no converts; basic shares +2.8% in 12 months; buyback active | PASS, watch the count |
| 4 | Insiders not selling in a cluster | Officer sales ~USD 130M year-to-date (~240M over twelve months), all under 10b5-1 plans (Form 4 footnotes checked). CEO, CFO, CTO and CLO all sold in the first week of January at USD 250+; since April only the CEO and COO sell, on schedule. Both enlarged their plans in May 2026: CEO up to 600,000 shares through Sep 2027, COO up to 780,000 through Aug 2027. CFO has not sold since January. One independent director bought USD 8.9M open-market at 132–150 in Feb–Mar 2026; the company bought back USD 240M at an average of 157.27. Tencent halved its stake in 2025. | FAIL on the letter of the checklist. The plans make it mechanical rather than a reaction to news, and the director's buy and the buyback cut the other way, but the two people who run the company have pre-committed to sell ~1.4M shares over the next year. This is the owner's stated deal-breaker: see kill condition 4. |
| 5 | Story matches the financials | Revenue +61% YoY, GAAP operating margin 29%, ARPU rising: the growth is real. But US DAUq fell sequentially in Q2 (53.5M → 53.2M) and management called Google referrals "choppy". | AMBER: the financials are honest; the growth engine is partly borrowed from Google. |
A genuinely profitable, cash-rich business with one structural dependence it does not control, and an insider pattern that fails the owner's own rule.
Price USD 157.25. Diluted shares 202M. Market cap ~USD 30B.
| Basis | EPS | P/E | Implied growth (P/E − 8.5) / 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trailing GAAP (TTM) | 4.31 | 36.5x | 14.0% |
| FY2026E GAAP consensus | 5.38 | 29.2x | 10.4% |
| FY2027E GAAP consensus | 7.04 | 22.3x | 6.9% |
| NTM non-GAAP | 9.68 | 16.2x | 3.9% |
The gap between trailing (14%) and forward (4–7%) implied growth is the rule-004 signal that the market is pricing an inflection: earnings roughly doubling in FY2026. Consensus has revenue +54% in FY2026 and +31% in FY2027.
Graham sensitivity, V = EPS × (8.5 + 2g):
| g | on FY26E 5.38 | on FY27E 7.04 |
|---|---|---|
| 0% | 46 | 60 |
| 5% | 100 | 130 |
| 7.5% | 126 | 165 |
| 10% | 153 | 201 |
| 15% | 207 | 271 |
| 20% | 261 | 341 |
Break-even growth at 157: 10.4% on FY26E, 6.9% on FY27E, against ~30% expected. On the formula the margin of safety is real, but it is the difference between what Google keeps sending and what the market assumes; it is not a cushion of assets or of a low multiple (10.9x sales, 44x SBC-adjusted FCF; peers: Pinterest 46x, Meta 95x on the same measure).
Scenarios on FY2027 GAAP EPS (assumptions, stated so they can be argued with):
| Case | p | EPS | Multiple | Value | vs price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear: Google/AI-Overview erosion, US DAUq flat-to-down, ad growth ~15% | 0.30 | 4.50 | 18x | 81 | −48% |
| Base: consensus | 0.45 | 7.04 | 22x | 155 | −2% |
| Bull: growth holds >30%, licensing renews up | 0.25 | 8.50 | 30x | 255 | +62% |
| Expected value | 158 | 1.00× price |
Verdict: fair, not cheap. Cheap was USD 119 in March, where the director bought. At 157 the price is the base case; Kelly as a go/no-go (rule-006) says no edge, so no adds here. Holding is a judgement about the Google dependence, not about price.
All-time high close 270.71 (2025-09-18) → 119.27 low (2026-03-30) → 2026 peak close 203.27 (2026-07-14) → 156.88 on 2026-08-27, which is −23% from the July peak and −42% from the 2025 high. The sequence, with dates: Jul 22 −8% on a WSJ report that Reddit may restrict Google's AI access as the ~USD 60M/yr licensing deal nears expiry; Jul 30 Q2 print beat on revenue, EPS and guide, but US DAUq slipped quarter-on-quarter and the letter called search referrals "choppy"; Jul 31 −21% on 30M shares; Aug 14 +13% on S&P 500 inclusion, then a sell-the-news fade; Aug 17–20 third-party data showing Reddit's share of ChatGPT search citations collapsing after an OpenAI change; Aug 31 EU "very large online platform" designation. Not macro: the index was up that week.
Two things to know about that fill. It sits almost exactly at the company's own buyback average (157.27 for the USD 240M repurchased in the first half). And a −23% drawdown in a name still at 11x sales is a lower price, not a margin of safety (rule-001, rule-004). The reddit threads recommending Reddit stock were the attention signal rule-001 warns about; none of them contained the SBC, logged-out-user or licensing-backlog numbers in this document.
Any one fires: re-score within five trading days; exit unless the thesis survives on the new numbers.
| Rung | USD | Anchor | Action | Alert |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TP1 | 200 | Graham V at g=15% on FY26E (207); Oppenheimer PT 200 | sell 2 of 5 | RDDT-TP1 |
| TP2 | 255 | Bull case; Truist/B. Riley PT zone | sell 2 | RDDT-TP2 |
| TP3 | 300 | Analyst high; near the prior peak | sell the last share unless fundamentals grew into it | RDDT-TP3 |
| Review | 133 | EV/price ≈ 1.2 with the thesis intact | re-check Google and DAUq; only then is an add cheap | RDDT-REVIEW133 |