Date: 2026-03-27 Price at time of research: $98.85 Context: Graham defensive value candidate evaluation; Reddit claim of "lowest since 2014"
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Current Price | $98.85 |
| 52-Week Range | $96.26 – $147.12 |
| 52-Week Change | -28.7% |
| vs. S&P 500 (52wk) | SPY +12.8% / KMB -28.7% (underperformed by ~42pp) |
| Market Cap | $32.8B |
| Enterprise Value | $39.7B |
| 50-Day MA | $103.26 (price -4.3% below) |
| 200-Day MA | $115.21 (price -14.2% below) |
| Beta | 0.23 (very low — defensive) |
"Lowest since 2014" claim: PARTIALLY TRUE, OVERSTATED.
| Metric | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Trailing P/E | 13.1x (adj) / 16.3x (GAAP) | See EPS note below |
| Forward P/E | 12.8x | FY2026E |
| P/B | 21.8x | Very high — negative equity history |
| EV/EBITDA | 12.4x | Based on $3.20B EBITDA |
| P/S | 2.0x | |
| P/FCF | ~54x (reported $912M FCF) / ~20x ($1.64B FCF) | Depends on FCF definition |
| Dividend Yield | 5.18% (fwd) / 5.07% (trailing) | |
| 5yr Avg Dividend Yield | 3.65% | Current yield well above avg |
EPS Note (important): yfinance trailingEps shows $4.86 — this is a GAAP subset (continuing operations only subset). The proper TTM EPS measures are:
The forward and adjusted P/Es of ~13x are reasonable for a defensive consumer staples company.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual Dividend Rate | $5.12/share (forward) |
| Trailing Annual Div | $5.04/share |
| Dividend Yield | 5.18% |
| Payout Ratio | 103.7% (vs GAAP EPS $4.86) — misleading |
| Actual Payout Ratio | ~68% (vs GAAP diluted $7.53 adj EPS) |
| Consecutive Increases | 52+ years — Dividend King |
| Ex-Dividend Date | ~2026-05-02 (estimated from data) |
10-Year Dividend Growth History: | Year | Annual Div | YoY Growth | |------|-----------|-----------| | 2015 | $3.52 | +8.1% | | 2016 | $3.68 | +4.5% | | 2017 | $3.88 | +5.4% | | 2018 | $4.00 | +3.1% | | 2019 | $4.12 | +3.0% | | 2020 | $4.28 | +3.9% | | 2021 | $4.56 | +6.5% | | 2022 | $4.64 | +1.8% | | 2023 | $4.72 | +1.7% | | 2024 | $4.88 | +3.4% | | 2025 | $5.04 | +3.3% |
Average 10-year DGR: ~3.9%/yr. Growth has decelerated from 5-8% range (2013-2018) to ~2-3% (2022-2025).
KMB is a Dividend King (50+ consecutive years of increases). The payout ratio appearing >100% vs the $4.86 yfinance EPS is a data artifact — real payout ratio vs adjusted EPS is ~68%.
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $16.45B | $16.81B | $17.15B |
| Gross Profit | $5.92B | $6.29B | $6.27B |
| Gross Margin | 36.0% | 37.4% | 36.6% |
| Operating Income | $2.35B | $2.80B | $2.59B |
| EBITDA | $3.11B | $3.47B | $2.65B |
| EBITDA Margin | 18.9% | 20.6% | 15.5% |
| Net Income | $2.02B | $2.55B | $1.76B |
| Net Margin | 12.3% | 15.1% | 10.3% |
Trend: Revenue declining (-1.3% in FY2025, -2.0% in FY2024, -2.0% in FY2023). This is a structural headwind: volume decline + divestiture of KC Professional / tissue segments. The company divested its tissue and professional businesses in 2024 ("KC One" restructuring), which explains the revenue decline. This is by design, not organic deterioration.
Margins contracted in FY2025 vs FY2024 peak. The 2023 EBITDA margin of 15.5% was depressed by input cost inflation (pulp, polyethylene).
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.78B | $3.23B | $3.54B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.14B | -$0.72B | -$0.77B |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.64B | $2.51B | $2.78B |
FY2025 FCF declined sharply due to elevated CapEx ($1.14B vs normalized $0.72B). The CapEx increase is tied to the K-C One restructuring program. Normalized FCF power is likely ~$2.2-2.5B based on prior years.
FCF Yield: $1.64B / $32.8B market cap = 5.0% (reported) or ~6.7-7.6% (normalized).
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | $17.10B | $16.55B |
| Total Debt | $7.30B | $7.53B |
| Long-Term Debt | $6.47B | $6.85B |
| Cash & Equivalents | $0.69B | $1.01B |
| Net Debt | $6.61B | $6.52B |
| Stockholders Equity | $1.50B | $0.84B |
| Current Assets | $5.31B | $5.58B |
| Current Liabilities | $7.13B | $7.00B |
| Current Ratio | 0.74x | 0.80x |
| Debt/Equity | 464.8x | Very high |
| Net Debt/EBITDA | 2.1x | 1.9x |
Balance Sheet Context: This is a known characteristic of mature consumer staples with decades of leveraged buybacks and negative retained equity. The D/E ratio of 465x is an artifact of cumulative buybacks having reduced book equity to near-zero — not indicative of financial distress. Net Debt/EBITDA of 2.1x is manageable for investment-grade consumer staples. KMB is rated A- (S&P).
The current ratio of 0.74x fails Graham's filter (requires ≥2.0). This is common for large US consumer staples (PG, CL, KMB all have sub-1 current ratios due to efficient working capital management and committed credit facilities).
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-02-09 | Samuel Todd Maclin | Director | Purchase | 10,000 | $1.04M |
| 2026-02-05 | Andrew Scribner | Officer | Sale | 3,049 | $318K |
| 2026-01-30 | Jeffrey Melucci | Officer | Disposition (tax/vest) | 4,466 | — |
| 2026-01-30 | Grant McGee | Gen Counsel | Disposition (tax/vest) | 3,529 | — |
| 2025-10-31 | Tamera Fenske | Officer | Stock Award Grant | 20,176 | $0 |
| 2025-08-04 | Zackery Hicks | CTO | Sale | 15,038 | $2.01M |
| 2025-07-29 | Zackery Hicks | CTO | Stock Award Grant | 38,098 | $0 |
Summary (Last 6 months):
Signal: The director Samuel Todd Maclin spent $1.04M of his own money on 10,000 shares at ~$104.15 (Feb 9). This is a genuine open-market purchase by an independent director — a positive signal per shr-002. The officer dispositions are mostly tax withholding events (vesting), not discretionary sales. The CTO sale in August was at $133.40 (well above current price). Overall insider signal: mildly bullish.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Consensus | Hold (2.53/5 scale) |
| # Analysts | 13 |
| Strong Buy | 3 |
| Buy | 3 |
| Hold | 8 |
| Sell | 1 |
| Strong Sell | 0 |
| Average Price Target | $114.46 |
| Median Price Target | $110.00 |
| High PT | $142.00 |
| Low PT | $90.00 |
| Upside to Mean PT | +15.8% |
Recent PT Change: Piper Sandler cut PT from $133 to $114 on March 18, 2026.
Consensus is a cautious Hold with ~16% upside to mean PT. No strong sell conviction despite the stock being down 29% over 12 months.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Short | 38.7M |
| Prior Month Short | 36.9M |
| MoM Change | +4.8% (shorts increasing) |
| Short % of Float | 13.1% |
| Days to Cover | 8.3 days |
| Float | 330.8M shares |
Short interest is building (+4.8% MoM) and at 13.1% is moderately elevated for a large-cap consumer staples company. 8.3 days to cover is significant. Shorts appear to be adding conviction bets against the stock — likely based on revenue decline trend and restructuring uncertainty, not a squeeze setup.
| Date | Headline |
|---|---|
| 2026-03-26 | "Assessing Kimberly-Clark (KMB) Valuation After Recent Share Price Weakness" (Simply Wall St.) |
| 2026-03-20 | "5 High-Yield Dividend Kings Down Over the Past Year Are 2026 Bargains" |
| 2026-03-20 | WSJ: "Project 'Buff Baby' Transformed a Huggies Diaper" — CEO spreading product innovation |
| 2026-03-20 | "2 Cash-Producing Stocks for Long-Term Investors" (StockStory) |
| 2026-03-19 | "Kimberly-Clark Ethics Honor And New Tech Leader Spark Value Debate" |
| 2026-03-19 | "3 Value Stocks with Open Questions" — KMB featured |
| 2026-03-18 | "2 Profitable Stocks with Impressive Fundamentals" |
| 2026-03-18 | Piper Sandler cuts PT to $114 from $133 |
Themes: Valuation debate at current lows, dividend yield attractiveness, analyst PT cuts, product innovation narrative (CEO's K-C One transformation), ethics recognition. No major negative catalyst in the last 30 days — the PT cut appears to be a response to Q4 results and guidance.
| Date | Close |
|---|---|
| 2025-10-05 | $119.63 |
| 2025-10-19 | $118.52 |
| 2025-11-09 | $101.35 ← sharp drop (~14%) |
| 2025-11-16 | $101.52 |
| 2025-11-30 | $106.49 |
| 2025-12-14 | $101.89 |
| 2025-12-28 | $99.77 |
| 2026-01-11 | $96.73 ← 52-week low area |
| 2026-01-25 | $100.98 |
| 2026-02-15 | $108.08 ← bounce attempt |
| 2026-03-01 | $110.08 |
| 2026-03-15 | $98.84 ← reversal |
| 2026-03-22 | $98.20 |
| 2026-03-27 | $98.85 |
The November 2025 drop (~14% in a week) was likely triggered by Q3 earnings / guidance. There was a brief recovery to $110 in Feb-Mar 2026, which has since reversed. The stock is testing the $96-99 support zone again.
| Quarter | EPS Actual | EPS Estimate | Surprise |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 2025 | $1.93 | $1.89 | +2.0% |
| Q2 2025 | $1.92 | $1.66 | +16.0% ← big beat |
| Q3 2025 | $1.82 | $1.75 | +3.9% |
| Q4 2025 | $1.86 | $1.81 | +2.7% |
All 4 quarters beat estimates. The Q2 beat (+16%) was substantial. Full-year adjusted EPS sum: $7.53. Consensus FY2026 EPS: $7.71 (+2.4% growth). The market is NOT pricing in EPS growth as the driver — the P/E contraction appears driven by revenue decline and restructuring uncertainty.
| Filter | Criterion | KMB Result | Pass? |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Adequate Size | Revenue > $500M | $16.4B | PASS |
| 2. Financial Condition | Current ratio ≥ 2.0 | 0.74x | FAIL* |
| 3. Earnings Stability | Profitable 10yr | Yes (profitable since 1870s) | PASS |
| 4. Dividend Record | Uninterrupted 20yr | 52+ years (Dividend King) | PASS |
| 5. Earnings Growth | EPS +33% over 10yr | EPS declining last 3yr | FAIL |
| 6. Moderate P/E | ≤ 15x | 13.1x (adj) / 16.3x (GAAP) | PASS/BORDERLINE |
| 7. Moderate P/B | ≤ 1.5x (or P/E×P/B ≤ 22.5) | P/B 21.8x | FAIL† |
*Current ratio failure is common for mature US consumer staples (shr-015 analog: financial structure artifact of buybacks, not distress). †P/B failure: KMB has near-zero equity due to ~30 years of buybacks. Not a solvency signal. The combined P/E × P/B = 285x wildly fails, but this metric breaks down for companies with minimal book equity.
Score: 3/7 Graham filters (passing: size, earnings stability, dividend record; borderline on P/E). This is a Growth Stock Addendum / yield-play analysis rather than pure Graham defensive.
| Growth Assumed | V (adj $7.53 EPS) | V (GAAP $6.07) | V (fwd $7.71) | MoS at $98.85 (adj) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0% | $62.58 | $50.45 | $64.10 | -58% (overvalued) |
| 3% | $106.76 | $86.06 | $109.34 | +7.4% |
| 5% | $136.21 | $109.80 | $139.51 | +27.4% |
| 7% | $165.66 | $133.54 | $169.67 | +40.3% |
| 10% | $209.84 | $169.15 | $214.92 | +52.9% |
Break-even growth rate (where V = $98.85): ~2.7% on adjusted EPS basis, ~4.5% on GAAP basis.
If you believe KMB can sustain 3-5% EPS growth (roughly matching or slightly exceeding its dividend growth rate of ~3.5%), then intrinsic value is $107-136 on adjusted EPS, implying modest to moderate margin of safety at current price.
| Category | Signal | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue trend | Declining 3 consecutive years (-1 to -2% annually) | RED |
| Margin trend | Gross margin contracted 2025 vs 2024 | AMBER |
| FCF trend | Declining ($2.78B → $1.64B) — but CapEx elevated by restructuring | AMBER |
| Balance sheet | Net Debt/EBITDA 2.1x, current ratio 0.74x | AMBER |
| Analyst direction | PT being cut (Piper Sandler: $133 → $114 March 2026) | AMBER |
| Short interest | Building (+4.8% MoM to 13.1%) with 8.3 DTC | AMBER |
| EPS growth | Consensus FY2026 only +2.4% — very low growth for P/E support | AMBER |
| Graham filter score | 3/7 — below 4/7 threshold for strong Graham buy | AMBER |
| Insider signal | Director open-market purchase of $1.04M (Feb 2026) | GREEN |
| Dividend | 52-year Dividend King, yield 5.18% above 5yr avg (3.65%) | GREEN |
| Earnings beats | Beat all 4 quarters in FY2025, especially Q2 (+16%) | GREEN |
| Valuation level | Price near 3-4yr lows, at/below 2022 trough | GREEN |
Is the revenue decline structural or transitional? KMB divested tissue/professional segments (KC One restructuring). Revenue decline is partly by design. Remaining business (personal care: diapers, hygiene) has better margin profiles. If restructuring completes in 2025-2026, the remaining segments may show organic growth.
Can EPS grow 3-5% needed to support current valuation? FY2026 consensus is only +2.4%. At $7.71 forward EPS × 13x P/E = $100 — barely above current price. The stock needs either multiple expansion (market recognizes restructuring value) or better-than-expected EPS growth.
Is the 5.18% yield sustainable? Real payout ratio vs adjusted EPS ~68% — sustainable. Vs GAAP EPS from continuing operations may be tighter. The 52-year streak creates strong management commitment to maintaining / growing the dividend.
Is the short interest thesis correct? Shorts are adding (13.1%, +4.8% MoM, 8.3 DTC). This is informed bearish conviction (shr-023 applies), not a squeeze setup. Shorts are likely betting on continued revenue decline and restructuring cost overruns.