Date: 2026-03-23 | Source: yfinance, SEC Form 4s, StockAnalysis, web search
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Current Price | $110.38 |
| 52-Week High | $211.48 |
| 52-Week Low | $98.00 |
| % Off High | -47.8% |
| Market Cap | $116.5B |
| Enterprise Value | $111.6B |
| Shares Outstanding | 1,047M |
| Metric | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Trailing GAAP EPS (FY2025) | $1.67 | Very low — SBC of $1.96B crushes GAAP earnings |
| Forward GAAP EPS (consensus) | $5.02 | Significant jump expected in FY2026 |
| Trailing P/E | 66.1x | Based on GAAP EPS $1.67 |
| Forward P/E | 22.0x | Based on GAAP EPS $5.02 |
| PEG Ratio (trailing) | 1.06x | Misleading at inflection point — see shr-005 |
| EV/Revenue | 8.4x | |
| EV/EBITDA | 40.8x | |
| Price/Book | 8.9x |
Key observation on P/E gap: Trailing P/E 66x vs Forward P/E 22x — a 3:1 ratio. Per shr-003, this reveals the market pricing a profitability inflection (GAAP earnings expected to roughly triple from $1.67 → ~$5.02), not sustained high historical growth. The relevant multiple for current entry is forward, not trailing.
| Year | Revenue | YoY Growth |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | $13.28B | +20.9% |
| FY2024 | $10.98B | +22.4% |
| FY2023 | $8.97B | +23.8% |
| FY2022 | $7.25B | baseline |
| FY2021 | $5.90B | — |
3-year revenue CAGR (2022-2025): ~22.4%. Highly consistent — NOW has decelerated only slightly.
| Year | GAAP EPS | Net Income |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | $1.67 | $1.75B |
| FY2024 | $1.37 | $1.43B |
| FY2023 | $1.68 | $1.73B |
| FY2022 | $0.32 | $0.33B |
| FY2021 | $0.23 | $0.23B |
Earnings stability: GAAP EPS has been positive every year in the data available (2021-2025 = 5 consecutive positive years). Pre-2021 data: NOW generated net losses in 2017-2019, turned GAAP profitable in 2020. This means NOW does NOT have 10+ years of unbroken profitability — it fails Graham's earnings stability filter on strict interpretation.
This is the most important section for valuation. Per shr-001, SBC is a real cost.
| Year | Op. CF | CapEx | Reported FCF | SBC | SBC-Adj FCF | SBC as % FCF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | $5.44B | -$911M | $4.53B | $1.96B | $2.58B | 43.1% |
| FY2024 | $4.27B | -$892M | $3.38B | $1.75B | $1.63B | 51.7% |
| FY2023 | $3.40B | -$697M | $2.70B | $1.60B | $1.10B | 59.2% |
| FY2022 | $2.72B | -$550M | $2.17B | $1.40B | $0.77B | 64.5% |
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
| P/FCF (reported) | 25.7x | 34.5x |
| P/FCF (SBC-adjusted) | 45.2x | 71.5x |
| FCF yield (reported) | 3.89% | 2.90% |
| FCF yield (SBC-adjusted) | 2.21% | 1.40% |
Critical finding: Reported FCF looks reasonable at 25.7x. SBC-adjusted FCF nearly doubles the multiple to 45.2x. SBC consumed 43% of reported FCF in 2025. The trend is improving (from 65% in 2022 → 43% in 2025) as the business scales, but SBC remains substantial. At 45.2x SBC-adjusted P/FCF, the stock is priced for continued high-growth execution — not a Graham defensive buy.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Cash & ST Investments | $3.73B |
| Total Debt | $2.40B |
| Net Cash | +$1.32B (net cash positive) |
| Current Assets | $10.47B |
| Current Liabilities | $10.44B |
| Current Ratio | 1.003x |
| Debt/Equity (yf reported) | 18.5 (misleading — see note) |
| Total Equity | $12.96B |
| Goodwill | $3.58B |
| Other Intangibles | $1.12B |
| Total Goodwill+Intangibles | $4.70B (36% of total equity) |
D/E ratio note: yfinance reports 18.5 — this appears to include deferred revenue liabilities which are not financial debt. The company is net cash positive ($1.32B), so actual financial leverage is low. Interest coverage: 99x (EBIT $2.28B / Interest $23M). Balance sheet is very strong.
Graham current ratio concern: 1.003x is significantly below Graham's 2x minimum. However, NOW's large deferred revenue (SaaS subscriptions paid upfront) inflates current liabilities — the cash underlying those subscriptions has already been collected. This is a reporting artifact of subscription business models, not financial distress (parallel to shr-015 for financial sector).
Share dilution: From 1,014M shares (2022) to 1,047M shares (2025) = +3.2% over 3 years (~1.1%/yr net). Modest — buybacks are partially offsetting SBC grants.
None. ServiceNow pays no dividend. Fails Graham's defensive filter requiring uninterrupted dividends for 20+ years.
| Date | Insider | Action | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 27, 2026 | William McDermott (CEO) | Open-market PURCHASE | 28,682 | $3,000,058 |
| Recent | Paul Fipps (Officer) | Sale | 3,696 | $376K |
| Recent | Paul Fipps (Officer) | Sale | 9,641 | $1.02M |
| Recent | Kevin McBride (Officer) | Sale | 1,400 | $148K |
Per web search (Form 8-K and Form 4 filings, Feb 2026):
| Category | Shares | Transactions |
|---|---|---|
| Purchases | 454,800 | 57 |
| Sales | 19,747 | 17 |
| Net | +435,053 | — |
| % Buy | 27.5% | — |
| % Sell | 1.2% | — |
Per shr-002: The CEO is spending $3M of his own money in an open-market purchase at ~$105. Five executives cancelled automated sales plans. This is a far stronger signal than RSU exercises or option grants. The buy/sell ratio (~23:1 by share count) is significantly bullish. However, "significant" must be weighed against the full picture.
| Rating | Count (current) |
|---|---|
| Strong Buy | 8 |
| Buy | 33 |
| Hold | 3 |
| Sell | 1 |
| Strong Sell | 0 |
| Total | 45 |
| Price Target | Value |
|---|---|
| High | $260.00 |
| Mean | $188.67 |
| Median | $182.50 |
| Low | $122.78 |
vs Current Price $110.38:
Consensus is overwhelming: 41 Buy/Strong Buy vs 4 Hold/Sell. Rating unchanged month-over-month.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Short | 26.5M |
| Float | 1,043M |
| Short % of Float | 2.5% |
| Days to Cover | 1.06 |
No short squeeze mechanics — 2.5% short interest is negligible. This is not a squeeze story.
| Growth Rate | Implied IV | vs $110.38 | Margin of Safety |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0% | $14.20 | -87.1% | Massively overvalued |
| 5% | $30.89 | -72.0% | Massively overvalued |
| 10% | $47.59 | -56.9% | Massively overvalued |
| 15% | $64.30 | -41.8% | Massively overvalued |
| 20% | $80.99 | -26.6% | Overvalued |
| 25% | $97.69 | -11.5% | Slightly overvalued |
At trailing EPS, NOW is overvalued at ANY reasonable growth rate. But trailing EPS is suppressed by ~$1.87 of SBC/tax/timing effects — GAAP EPS understates business economics.
| Growth Rate | Implied IV | vs $110.38 | Margin of Safety |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0% | $42.68 | -61.3% | Negative |
| 5% | $92.88 | -15.9% | Negative |
| ~6.6% | ~$110 | 0% | Break-even |
| 10% | $143.09 | +29.6% | Positive |
| 15% | $193.30 | +75.1% | Positive |
| 20% | $243.50 | +120.6% | Positive |
Break-even growth rate: ~6.6% long-term — if you believe NOW can grow GAAP EPS at more than 6.6%/yr long-term, the forward-basis Graham formula says the stock is fair or cheap. Given 20%+ revenue growth and improving GAAP margins, 6.6% EPS growth looks very achievable — implying the stock has upside at 10%+ growth scenarios.
The key inflection: The GAAP EPS is projected to jump from $1.67 (FY2025) to $5.02 (FY2026) — a ~3x increase in one year. This is the profitability inflection that makes trailing-basis analysis nearly useless (per shr-003 and shr-004).
| Filter | Requirement | NOW Result | Pass? |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Adequate size | Revenue >$100M | $13.28B | PASS |
| 2. Strong financial condition | Current ratio >2x | 1.003x (deferred rev artifact) | FAIL (artifact) |
| 3. Earnings stability | 5+ years positive EPS | Positive 2021-2025; GAAP losses before 2020 | PARTIAL |
| 4. Dividend record | 20 years uninterrupted | No dividend ever | FAIL |
| 5. EPS growth | +33% over 10 years | EPS positive trend, only 5yr data | NEEDS CHECK |
| 6. Moderate P/E | <15x trailing | 66.1x trailing | FAIL |
| 7. Moderate P/B | <1.5x (or P/E×P/B <22.5) | 8.9x P/B | FAIL |
Score: 1 hard PASS, 1 partial, 5 FAIL.
NOW fails the Graham defensive screen comprehensively, as expected for a high-growth tech compounder. This does not mean it's a bad investment — it means it must be evaluated as a growth stock, not a defensive stock.
Per the Growth Stock Addendum framework: buy when implied growth from current P/E is ≤ achievable growth rate, with margin.
The claim: "NOW is cheap at 50% off highs."
Verdict: Nuanced — cheap vs highs, but not cheap on trailing Graham metrics.
NOW at $110 is a growth stock at a compressed valuation — it is not a Graham defensive bargain. The "cheap" argument only works if you accept:
If those conditions hold, the stock has 30-70% upside. If the FY2026 earnings inflection disappoints, the forward P/E blows back out and there is no valuation floor.
Bottom line for an Intelligent Investor framework: NOT a Graham defensive buy. Could be a Growth Stock Addendum candidate if you have conviction on the GAAP profitability inflection and trust the insider signal. The $3M CEO purchase at $104-106 is the single most compelling data point. At 22x forward P/E with 20% revenue growth and a CEO buying $3M of stock, it is arguably the most compelling growth stock setup in large-cap software right now — but you need a growth framework, not a Graham defensive framework, to justify it.
Sources: yfinance (price, financials, insider data), SEC Form 4 / Form 8-K (McDermott purchase), StockAnalysis.com (historical financials), web search (insider context)