ServiceNow (NOW) — Graham-Style Analysis

Date: 2026-03-23 | Source: yfinance, SEC Form 4s, StockAnalysis, web search


1. Price & Market Cap

Metric Value
Current Price $110.38
52-Week High $211.48
52-Week Low $98.00
% Off High -47.8%
Market Cap $116.5B
Enterprise Value $111.6B
Shares Outstanding 1,047M

2. Valuation Ratios

Metric Value Note
Trailing GAAP EPS (FY2025) $1.67 Very low — SBC of $1.96B crushes GAAP earnings
Forward GAAP EPS (consensus) $5.02 Significant jump expected in FY2026
Trailing P/E 66.1x Based on GAAP EPS $1.67
Forward P/E 22.0x Based on GAAP EPS $5.02
PEG Ratio (trailing) 1.06x Misleading at inflection point — see shr-005
EV/Revenue 8.4x
EV/EBITDA 40.8x
Price/Book 8.9x

Key observation on P/E gap: Trailing P/E 66x vs Forward P/E 22x — a 3:1 ratio. Per shr-003, this reveals the market pricing a profitability inflection (GAAP earnings expected to roughly triple from $1.67 → ~$5.02), not sustained high historical growth. The relevant multiple for current entry is forward, not trailing.


3. Revenue & EPS Growth

Revenue (Annual)

Year Revenue YoY Growth
FY2025 $13.28B +20.9%
FY2024 $10.98B +22.4%
FY2023 $8.97B +23.8%
FY2022 $7.25B baseline
FY2021 $5.90B

3-year revenue CAGR (2022-2025): ~22.4%. Highly consistent — NOW has decelerated only slightly.

GAAP Diluted EPS (Annual)

Year GAAP EPS Net Income
FY2025 $1.67 $1.75B
FY2024 $1.37 $1.43B
FY2023 $1.68 $1.73B
FY2022 $0.32 $0.33B
FY2021 $0.23 $0.23B

Earnings stability: GAAP EPS has been positive every year in the data available (2021-2025 = 5 consecutive positive years). Pre-2021 data: NOW generated net losses in 2017-2019, turned GAAP profitable in 2020. This means NOW does NOT have 10+ years of unbroken profitability — it fails Graham's earnings stability filter on strict interpretation.

Quarterly EPS Beat History (Non-GAAP aligned):


4. Free Cash Flow & SBC-Adjusted FCF

This is the most important section for valuation. Per shr-001, SBC is a real cost.

Year Op. CF CapEx Reported FCF SBC SBC-Adj FCF SBC as % FCF
FY2025 $5.44B -$911M $4.53B $1.96B $2.58B 43.1%
FY2024 $4.27B -$892M $3.38B $1.75B $1.63B 51.7%
FY2023 $3.40B -$697M $2.70B $1.60B $1.10B 59.2%
FY2022 $2.72B -$550M $2.17B $1.40B $0.77B 64.5%

P/FCF Multiples (at $110.38 / $116.5B market cap)

Metric FY2025 FY2024
P/FCF (reported) 25.7x 34.5x
P/FCF (SBC-adjusted) 45.2x 71.5x
FCF yield (reported) 3.89% 2.90%
FCF yield (SBC-adjusted) 2.21% 1.40%

Critical finding: Reported FCF looks reasonable at 25.7x. SBC-adjusted FCF nearly doubles the multiple to 45.2x. SBC consumed 43% of reported FCF in 2025. The trend is improving (from 65% in 2022 → 43% in 2025) as the business scales, but SBC remains substantial. At 45.2x SBC-adjusted P/FCF, the stock is priced for continued high-growth execution — not a Graham defensive buy.


5. Balance Sheet

Metric Value
Cash & ST Investments $3.73B
Total Debt $2.40B
Net Cash +$1.32B (net cash positive)
Current Assets $10.47B
Current Liabilities $10.44B
Current Ratio 1.003x
Debt/Equity (yf reported) 18.5 (misleading — see note)
Total Equity $12.96B
Goodwill $3.58B
Other Intangibles $1.12B
Total Goodwill+Intangibles $4.70B (36% of total equity)

D/E ratio note: yfinance reports 18.5 — this appears to include deferred revenue liabilities which are not financial debt. The company is net cash positive ($1.32B), so actual financial leverage is low. Interest coverage: 99x (EBIT $2.28B / Interest $23M). Balance sheet is very strong.

Graham current ratio concern: 1.003x is significantly below Graham's 2x minimum. However, NOW's large deferred revenue (SaaS subscriptions paid upfront) inflates current liabilities — the cash underlying those subscriptions has already been collected. This is a reporting artifact of subscription business models, not financial distress (parallel to shr-015 for financial sector).

Share dilution: From 1,014M shares (2022) to 1,047M shares (2025) = +3.2% over 3 years (~1.1%/yr net). Modest — buybacks are partially offsetting SBC grants.


6. Dividend

None. ServiceNow pays no dividend. Fails Graham's defensive filter requiring uninterrupted dividends for 20+ years.


7. Insider Activity (Last 6 Months)

McDermott CEO Purchase — HIGH CONVICTION SIGNAL

Date Insider Action Shares Value
Feb 27, 2026 William McDermott (CEO) Open-market PURCHASE 28,682 $3,000,058
Recent Paul Fipps (Officer) Sale 3,696 $376K
Recent Paul Fipps (Officer) Sale 9,641 $1.02M
Recent Kevin McBride (Officer) Sale 1,400 $148K

Coordinated Signal — Beyond the $3M Purchase

Per web search (Form 8-K and Form 4 filings, Feb 2026):

6-Month Aggregate (per yfinance insider_purchases summary)

Category Shares Transactions
Purchases 454,800 57
Sales 19,747 17
Net +435,053
% Buy 27.5%
% Sell 1.2%

Per shr-002: The CEO is spending $3M of his own money in an open-market purchase at ~$105. Five executives cancelled automated sales plans. This is a far stronger signal than RSU exercises or option grants. The buy/sell ratio (~23:1 by share count) is significantly bullish. However, "significant" must be weighed against the full picture.


8. Analyst Consensus

Rating Count (current)
Strong Buy 8
Buy 33
Hold 3
Sell 1
Strong Sell 0
Total 45
Price Target Value
High $260.00
Mean $188.67
Median $182.50
Low $122.78

vs Current Price $110.38:

Consensus is overwhelming: 41 Buy/Strong Buy vs 4 Hold/Sell. Rating unchanged month-over-month.


9. Short Interest

Metric Value
Shares Short 26.5M
Float 1,043M
Short % of Float 2.5%
Days to Cover 1.06

No short squeeze mechanics — 2.5% short interest is negligible. This is not a squeeze story.


10. Graham Intrinsic Value: V = EPS × (8.5 + 2g)

Using Trailing GAAP EPS ($1.67)

Growth Rate Implied IV vs $110.38 Margin of Safety
0% $14.20 -87.1% Massively overvalued
5% $30.89 -72.0% Massively overvalued
10% $47.59 -56.9% Massively overvalued
15% $64.30 -41.8% Massively overvalued
20% $80.99 -26.6% Overvalued
25% $97.69 -11.5% Slightly overvalued

At trailing EPS, NOW is overvalued at ANY reasonable growth rate. But trailing EPS is suppressed by ~$1.87 of SBC/tax/timing effects — GAAP EPS understates business economics.

Using Forward GAAP EPS ($5.02, FY2026 consensus)

Growth Rate Implied IV vs $110.38 Margin of Safety
0% $42.68 -61.3% Negative
5% $92.88 -15.9% Negative
~6.6% ~$110 0% Break-even
10% $143.09 +29.6% Positive
15% $193.30 +75.1% Positive
20% $243.50 +120.6% Positive

Break-even growth rate: ~6.6% long-term — if you believe NOW can grow GAAP EPS at more than 6.6%/yr long-term, the forward-basis Graham formula says the stock is fair or cheap. Given 20%+ revenue growth and improving GAAP margins, 6.6% EPS growth looks very achievable — implying the stock has upside at 10%+ growth scenarios.

The key inflection: The GAAP EPS is projected to jump from $1.67 (FY2025) to $5.02 (FY2026) — a ~3x increase in one year. This is the profitability inflection that makes trailing-basis analysis nearly useless (per shr-003 and shr-004).


11. Graham 7-Filter Defensive Screen

Filter Requirement NOW Result Pass?
1. Adequate size Revenue >$100M $13.28B PASS
2. Strong financial condition Current ratio >2x 1.003x (deferred rev artifact) FAIL (artifact)
3. Earnings stability 5+ years positive EPS Positive 2021-2025; GAAP losses before 2020 PARTIAL
4. Dividend record 20 years uninterrupted No dividend ever FAIL
5. EPS growth +33% over 10 years EPS positive trend, only 5yr data NEEDS CHECK
6. Moderate P/E <15x trailing 66.1x trailing FAIL
7. Moderate P/B <1.5x (or P/E×P/B <22.5) 8.9x P/B FAIL

Score: 1 hard PASS, 1 partial, 5 FAIL.

NOW fails the Graham defensive screen comprehensively, as expected for a high-growth tech compounder. This does not mean it's a bad investment — it means it must be evaluated as a growth stock, not a defensive stock.


12. Growth Stock Addendum (per shr-004)

Per the Growth Stock Addendum framework: buy when implied growth from current P/E is ≤ achievable growth rate, with margin.


Summary Verdict: Reddit Thesis Assessment

The claim: "NOW is cheap at 50% off highs."

Verdict: Nuanced — cheap vs highs, but not cheap on trailing Graham metrics.

What the bull case gets right:

  1. The stock is -47.8% from its 52-week high — significant compression
  2. CEO purchased $3M of stock open-market at $104-106, and five executives cancelled auto-sell plans — very strong insider signal (shr-002)
  3. Forward P/E of 22x is reasonable for a 20%+ revenue compounder with dominant market position
  4. At 10%+ long-term growth, the Graham formula (forward EPS) implies 30%+ upside
  5. Analyst consensus: 41/45 analysts rate Buy/Strong Buy, median PT $182.50 (+65%)
  6. Revenue growth: 20-23% for 4 consecutive years — no slowdown visible
  7. Balance sheet: net cash positive $1.32B, 99x interest coverage

What the bull case hides (hard numbers):

  1. Trailing P/E: 66x — this is the "cheap" stock. On GAAP trailing, it has never been a Graham buy.
  2. SBC is massive: $1.96B in 2025 = 43% of reported FCF. True owner's FCF is $2.58B, not $4.53B. P/SBC-adjusted FCF = 45.2x — expensive.
  3. Graham formula fails on trailing EPS at every growth rate up to 25%.
  4. No dividend. No 20-year earnings history. Classic growth tech — 0/7 on Graham's strict defensive filters (or at best 1/7).
  5. Current ratio 1.003x — technically fails Graham's filter (though it's a SaaS accounting artifact).
  6. SBC dilution: $1.96B/year in compensation is funded by shareholders even if share count looks stable.
  7. Earnings stability: GAAP losses pre-2020. Profitable only for ~5-6 years. Does not meet Graham's long earnings history standard.

The honest framing:

NOW at $110 is a growth stock at a compressed valuation — it is not a Graham defensive bargain. The "cheap" argument only works if you accept:

If those conditions hold, the stock has 30-70% upside. If the FY2026 earnings inflection disappoints, the forward P/E blows back out and there is no valuation floor.

Bottom line for an Intelligent Investor framework: NOT a Graham defensive buy. Could be a Growth Stock Addendum candidate if you have conviction on the GAAP profitability inflection and trust the insider signal. The $3M CEO purchase at $104-106 is the single most compelling data point. At 22x forward P/E with 20% revenue growth and a CEO buying $3M of stock, it is arguably the most compelling growth stock setup in large-cap software right now — but you need a growth framework, not a Graham defensive framework, to justify it.


Sources: yfinance (price, financials, insider data), SEC Form 4 / Form 8-K (McDermott purchase), StockAnalysis.com (historical financials), web search (insider context)